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Notes & Comments
E-Service: Ensuring the Integrity of
International E-Mail Service of
Process
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that one day you are surfing the internet and you log
into your e-mail account. You click on one of the new, unfamiliar
looking e-mail messages and presto, you have just been served
with process. While this scenario currently may seem quite far-
fetched, without the proper mechanisms in place to ensure the
integrity of the service regime, this frightening hypothetical may
become a common reality. Prior to 2002, no United States court of
appeals had ever authorized service of process on an international
defendant via e-mail. 1 The Ninth Circuit, however, changed the
landscape of international service of process in Rio Properties, Inc.
v. Rio International Interlink.2 While there are clear advantages
to using e-mail in this area of civil procedure, there are serious
shortfalls to consider as well. 3 Therefore, this comment proposes
that while service of process via e-mail may be a viable way to
effectuate service on defendants located outside of the United
States, courts should administer a balancing test to assure that e-
mail is practical and sufficient to give reasonably calculated
notice. 4
1. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th
Cir. 2002).
2. Id. at 1012, 1017-19 (holding that e-mail service of process pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) was proper).
3. See infra Part V.
4. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
285
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Part I of this comment will trace the history and evolution of
service of process. Part II will discuss the two cases that started
the recent trend in permitting e-mail service, Broadfoot v. Diaz5
and Rio, followed by a discussion of how other courts have reacted
to the broad balancing test employed by the Rio court 6 in Part III.
Part IV will then analyze whether e-mail service is permitted
under the Hague Service Convention, 7 and Part V will discuss the
benefits and shortfalls of such service abroad. Finally, Part VI of
this comment proposes a more exacting balancing test than the
Ninth Circuit's8 to further ensure that e-mail is appropriate.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF SERVICE OF PROCESS
A. The Constitutional Standard
Service of process is required under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in both the domestic9 and international context.10
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has established
that service under the appropriate statute or rule is necessary to
acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant."i  As both
personal jurisdiction' 2 and proper service of process are required
for courts to exercise authority over defendants,' 3 it is important
(1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.") (citing
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
5. (In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.), 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2000).
6. See Rio, 284 F.3d at 1018.
7. See Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague
Service Convention].
8. See Rio, 284 F.3d at 1018.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
11. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105
(1987).
12. Personal jurisdiction will not be covered in this comment, but note
that it is required for courts to assert power over the defendant. See, e.g.,
LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 7-59 (Michie 1996).
13. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,
350 (1999) ("In the absence of service of process ... a court ordinarily may
not exercise power over a party.... ."); see also Omni Capital Int'l, 484 U.S. at
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to understand the history and evolution of proper service.
Therefore, this comment will first discuss the constitutional
standard for service of process.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the
constitutional standard for proper service in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 14 There, a trustee petitioned for
judicial settlement of accounting of a common trust fund. 15
Following New York law, the beneficiaries of the trusts were
notified of the petition by publication in a local newspaper. 16 The
special guardian and attorney appointed for the beneficiaries
argued that such notice failed to afford them due process. 17 In
announcing the constitutional standard, the Court stated that
notice to the parties must be "reasonably calculated, under all
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."18 Using this standard, the Court held that notice by
publication satisfied due process with regard to the beneficiaries
whose interests or addresses were unknown and could not be
discovered with due diligence. 19 Such notice, however, failed to
satisfy the due process rights of those beneficiaries whose
addresses were known, "because under the circumstances
[publication was] not reasonably calculated to reach those who
could easily be informed by other means at hand.
20
B. Alternative Methods of Service of Process
Since Mullane, courts have satisfied due process by
authorizing alternative methods of service when traditional
personal, published, and registered mail have been insufficient.
In Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp.,21 the Southern District of New
104 ("[blefore a .. .court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.").
14. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
15. Id. at 309.
16. Id. at 309-10.
17. Id. at 310-11.
18. Id. at 314. The Court also reiterated that "[t]he fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Id. (quoting
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
19. Id. at 317-18.
20. Id. at 319.
21. 248 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
288 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:285
York authorized service by ordinary mail.22 There, service by both
registered mail (returned "unclaimed" to the clerk) and personal
service (the defendant, a Canadian resident, was in Alaska at the
time) proved ineffective. 23 As a result, the plaintiff received a
court order that authorized service by ordinary mail to three
different addresses. 24 In another alternative measure, the Second
Circuit authorized the plaintiff to mail service of process to the
defendant's last known address, 25 using the court's power under
former Rule 4(i)(1)(E). 26 Moreover, the District of Maine has
permitted service on the defendant's attorney.27
The preceding cases illustrate various .means that have
satisfied the constitutional standard articulated in Mullane.28
However, no court had moved so far as to allow service of process
via e-mail until the year 2000.29
II. BROADFOOTAND Rio: THE BIRTH OF E-MAIL SERVICE
The Broadfoot and Rio decisions ushered in the new era of
international service of process via e-mail.
A. Broadfoot v. Diaz
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Georgia became the first court to authorize e-mail
service. 30  The dispute centered around the trustee of
International Telemedia Associates, Inc. (Broadfoot), who was
22. Id. at 541.
23. Id. at 540-41.
24. Id. at 540.
25. Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 176-78 (2d Cir. 1979).
26. Id. at 176. Rule 4(i)(1)(E) is now Rule 4(f)(3). See FED. R. Civ. P.
4(f)(3); Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.), 245 B.R. 713,
719 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000). In permitting such service, the Second Circuit
noted that "no one form of substitute service is favored over any other so long
as the method chosen is reasonably calculated, under the circumstances of
the particular case, to give the defendant actual notice of the pendency of the
lawsuit and an opportunity to present his defense." Vesco, 593 F.2d at 176.
27. Forum Fin. Group, LLC v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
199 F.R.D. 22, 22-24 (D. Me. 2001) (because the defendant's attorney had
accepted service in prior proceedings and the defendant had been evading
service, the court allowed service on the attorney).
28. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
29. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 720 & n.5, 721.
30. Id.
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seeking damages for mismanagement by Diaz, a former officer and
director of the company. 31 However, despite the best efforts of the
trustee, Diaz could not be located to effectuate properly service of
process.32  Indeed, the trustee never received a permanent
address or a telephone number; instead, the trustee had a
facsimile number and an e-mail address. 33 Therefore, the court
held that it was authorized under Rule 4(f)(3)34 to direct service to
the defendant's last known address, and his facsimile and e-mail
address.35
Rule 4(f)(3) proved pivotal to the court's authorization of
service via e-mail. The court noted that the rule's flexibility
permitted the "utilization of modern communication technologies
to effectuate service when warranted by the facts."36 Therefore,
because traditional means of service proved futile in reaching
Diaz,37 Rule 4(f)(3) authorized the court to fashion alternative
methods of service upon him.38 Furthermore, the court found that
31. Id. at 715.
32. Id. at 718.
33. Id.
34. Rule 4(f)(3) provides:
(f) Service Upon Individuals in a Foreign Country. Unless otherwise
provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom a
waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an infant or an
incompetent person, may be effected in a place not within any
judicial district of the United States:
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may
be directed by the court.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
35. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 720-21. The actual motion before the court
was for entry of default judgment against Diaz. Id. at 715. In deciding the
motion, the court discussed whether its previous order directing service of
process via e-mail was proper. Id. at 719-21.
36. Id. at 720.
37. Id. at 718. The court noted that Diaz eluded service by refusing to
provide the trustee with a permanent business or residential address and
telephone number, and by traveling throughout Europe and the Far East
without identifying where he would be at any given time. Id. Even Diaz's
mother could not locate him. Id.
38. Id. at 720. It is important to note that "[iun the absence of any
dispute or evidence to the contrary," the court presumed that the order
authorizing the disputed means of service did not violate any international
agreements. Id. at 720 n.4. A discussion of whether the Hague Service
Convention prohibits e-mail will take place infra Part IV.
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because Diaz preferred to communicate via e-mail and facsimile,
serving him by such methods provided reasonably calculated
notice that an action had been initiated against him.39 Thus, with
authorization within the federal rules for courts to direct
alternative means of service that are constitutionally sufficient, e-
mail service of process was born.
B. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink
Two years after Broadfoot, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
authorized service via e-mail on an international defendant. 40
There, two companies were both using the "Rio" name in their
respective internet gambling businesses. 41 Because the plaintiff
had several registered trademarks with that name, it sued the
defendant for trademark infringement. 42 The plaintiff tried to
serve the defendant's attorney (who declined to accept service) and
the defendant's international courier, IEC (which was not
authorized to accept service). 43 Finally conceding the difficulty of
traditional service, the plaintiff filed a motion for alternative
service of process.44 The district court granted the plaintiffs
motion and ordered, inter alia, service via e-mail.45
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit discussed the use of e-mail
service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3). 46 First, the court rejected the
defendant's arguments that Rule 4(f) created a hierarchy of
service mechanisms that required parties to attempt service under
subsections (1) and (2) before petitioning for alternative relief
under subsection (3).47 Instead, it held that Rule 4(f)(3) is an
equal means of effectuating service as the other alternatives listed
under section (f). 48
39. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 721.
40. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017-19 (9th Cir.
2002).
41. Id. at 1012.
42. Id. at 1012-13.
43. Id. at 1013.
44. Id.
45. Id. The district court also ordered service by mail to the defendant's
attorney and IEC. Id.
46. Id. at 1014-16.
47. Id.
48. Id. In examining Rule 4(f), the court found that subsections (2) and(3) are independent alternatives because they are separated by the
conjunction "or." Id. at 1015; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2)-(3).
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Next, in applying Rule 4(f)(3), the court noted that because
the defendant was a Costa Rican entity, the district court was not
prohibited by any international agreement from issuing an order
pursuant to the rule. 49 Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff
"need not have attempted every permissible means of service of
process before petitioning the court for alternative relief,"50 and
because the defendant's elusive nature thwarted the plaintiffs
attempts at service, the district court properly exercised its
authority in "craft[ing] alternate means of service."5
1
Finally, the court had to decide whether the alternative
methods of service satisfied due process. Turning to this question,
the court found that e-mail was reasonably calculated to afford
notice to the defendant. 52 The defendant did not list an easily
discoverable address in either the United States or Costa Rica, but
did advertise its e-mail address on its website and print media.
53
Indeed, it seemed as if the defendant could only be contacted by e-
mail. 54 The court also noted some of the potential weaknesses of
e-mail service, such as difficulties in confirming receipt, but
deferred the question of whether it is the proper mode of service to
the district courts. 55
Note that in both Broadfoot and Rio e-mail was not the only
method of service authorized by the courts under Rule 4(0(3).56
Even if e-mail were the only option, the courts would have likely
still ruled the same way unless e-mail failed to provide the
defendants with notice reasonably calculated to afford them an
49. Rio, 284 F.3d at 1015 n4; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) (permits
service of process by means not prohibited by international agreement).
Costa Rica is not a signatory to the Hague Service Convention. Rio, 284 F.3d
at 1015 n.4.
50. Id. at 1016.
51. Id. The Ninth Circuit also emphasized that the district court's order
authorizing e-mailed service "ensure[d] the smooth functioning of ... courts."
Id.
52. Id. at 1017.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1018.
55. Id. at 1018-19. The court directed the district courts to weigh the
costs and the benefits of e-mail service. Id. at 1018.
56. In Broadfoot, the court directed service by facsimile transmission and
mail to the defendant's last known address, (In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs.,
Inc.), 245 B.R. 713, 720-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000), and in Rio, the district
court ordered service by mail to the defendant's attorney and international
courier, 284 F.3d at 1013, 1017.
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opportunity to be heard. It must be true, however, that likelihood
of satisfying due process increases with the use of other service
methods.
III. POST-RIo: THE TREND TOWARDS AUTHORIZING E-MAIL SERVICE
Since Broadfoot and Rio, the issue of email service has
reached other courts. While several courts have authorized e-mail
service, 57 others have held that such service does not satisfy
constitutional due process. 58 This comment will next discuss how
other courts have handled the issue of e-mail service of process.
A. Courts that Have Authorized Email Service of Process
First, this comment will examine cases decided by courts
authorizing e-mail service.
The Northern District of California held that e-mail service
was proper in Viz Communications, Inc. v. Redsun.59 This case
involved a trademark dispute regarding a website that allegedly
infringed on the plaintiffs rights in a magazine entitled
"Animerica.'' 60 The plaintiff petitioned the court to serve the
defendants-a Japanese entity and an individual residing in
Japan-by e-mail after it unsuccessfully tried to serve them at
several addresses listed on the defendants' domain name
registry. 61 In upholding its previous order permitting e-mail
service of process, the court noted that "e-mail is the sole means of
contact on the animerican.com [website]. Changes in the
registration of the animerica.com domain name, and ambiguity in
the mailing address, suggest that the operators of the . .
[website] well may have sought to avoid disclosure of appropriate
contact information. ''62 Therefore, under the circumstances, e-
57. See D'Acquisto v. Triffo, No. 05-C-0810, 2006 WL 44057, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 6, 2006); Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231 F.R.D. 483, 488 (N.D. W.
Va. 2005); Popular Enters., LLC v. Webcom Media Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D.
560, 563 (E.D. Tenn. 2004); Viz Commc'ns, Inc. v. Redsun, No. C-01-04235
JF, 2003 WL 23901766, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2003).
58. See Ehrenfeld v. Salim A Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005
WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005); Pfizer, Inc. v. Domains By Proxy,
No. Civ.A.3:04 CV 741(SR., 2004 WL 1576703, at *1 (D. Conn. July 13, 2004).
59. 2003 WL 23901766, at *6.
60. Id. at *1-2.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *6.
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mail service satisfied constitutional due process because it
sufficiently informed the defendants "of the pendency of [the]
lawsuit."63
The Eastern District of Tennessee permitted the use of e-mail
service in another trademark infringement case.64 Pursuant to
Rule 4(f)(3), the court granted such service because the
defendant's address was unknown and service by mail proved
unsuccessful. 6 5 Furthermore, the court briefly addressed e-mail
service and its interplay with the Hague Service Convention.
66
The court noted that the plaintiff first attempted service pursuant
to the Convention, but because the defendant had not provided a
known address, it was inapplicable. 67 Therefore, the court did not
decide the difficult question of whether the Hague Service
Convention allows service via e-mail.
Next, the Northern District of West Virginia authorized e-
mail service in Williams v. Advertising Sex LLC.68 There, the
plaintiff moved the court pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) for an order
permitting her to serve three of the defendants-an individual
and two business entities located in Australia-by e-mail,
international registered mail, and international standard mail.
69
In support of her motion, the plaintiff averred that she had tried
physical service on the defendants thirteen times, contacting them
by phone, and serving them via international registered mail, all
of which had failed.70 In granting the plaintiffs motion, the court
first found that it had the power to order alternative service of
process pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) because such service was not
prohibited by any international agreement. 71 Next, the court held
that the alternative service requested comported with due process
because the defendants were "sophisticated participants in e-
63. Id.
64. Popular Enters., LLC v. Webcom Media Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 560,
561, 563 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
65. Id. at 562-63.
66. See id. at 562.
67. Id.; see also Hague Service Convention, supra note 8, art. I ("This
convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with
the document is not known.").
68. 231 F.R.D. 483, 488 (N.D. W. Va. 2005).
69. Id. at 485.
70. Id. at 486.
71. Id.
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commerce," 72 making e-mail a reliable method of communication,
and because they were aware that the plaintiff was trying to serve
them and resisted.73  Thus, e-mail service was reasonably
calculated to afford the defendants notice and an opportunity to
contest the plaintiffs allegations.
74
Additionally, in D'Acquisto v. Triffo,7 5 the Eastern District of
Wisconsin authorized service of process via e-mail under Rule 4
(f)(3). 76  The court directed e-mail service mainly because it
appeared the defendant was avoiding service, the plaintiffs
previous service attempts had failed, and the parties had
previously communicated by e-mail.7 7 The defendant resided in
Canada, which is a member nation of the Hague Service
Convention. 78 However, the court did not discuss whether e-mail
was prohibited by the Convention, but instead discussed the
Canadian rules of procedure for authorizing alternative service.
79
This discussion of Canadian rules of procedure is interesting
because Rule 4(f)(3) permits service that is not prohibited by
international agreement, never mentioning foreign rules of civil
procedure.8 0 Whether the court purposefully avoided the issue or
misunderstood the applicable standard, it is clear that the court
did not properly follow Rule 4(f)(3). 8 1
State courts have also allowed e-mail service under their state
rules. The New York Supreme Court of Oswego County permitted
e-mail service of process in Hollow v. Hollow.8 2 In this divorce
proceeding, the defendant-husband relocated to Saudi Arabia and
boasted via e-mail to his wife that "there's nothing anyone can do
72. Id. at 487. The plaintiff also increased the reliability of e-mailed
service by proposing to serve process through a website called 'Proof of
Service-electronic,' which offers encrypted on-line delivery of documents and
returns a digitally signed proof of delivery once the document has been
received by the target e-mail .. " Id.
73. Id. at 488.
74. Id.
75. No. 05-C-0810, 2006 WL 44057 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2006).
76. Id. at *2. The court also directed service "by hand deliver[y] and
mail[] ... to [the] defendant['s] ... sister." Id.
77. Id. at *1-2.
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id. at *2.
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3); see also Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l
Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002).
81. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(f)(3).
82. 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705, 708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
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to me here."8 3 The wife petitioned the court to authorize service
pursuant to section 308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules.8 4 According to the record, personal service would have
been nearly impossible and service by letters rogatory could have
taken up to eighteen months.8 5 The court thus found that service
by the methods prescribed in section 308 was impractical, giving
the court the power to direct alternative means of service.86 In
authorizing service of process to the defendant's last known e-mail
address, 87 the court noted that the defendant "secreted himself
behind a steel door, bolted shut, communicating with the plaintiff
and his children exclusively through e-mail. '88 Furthermore,
because the defendant only communicated via e-mail with his
wife,89 it was probably the surest way to apprise him of the
pendency of the action.
The trend toward allowing international service of process via
e-mail is a developing area of law with some common threads.
First, most courts have dealt with the issue in the context of Rule
4(f)(3). 90  Second, the issue only arises when the plaintiff has
petitioned the court to authorize alternative means of service.
91
Third, as the Ninth Circuit held, Rule 4(f) does not create a
hierarchy of service mechanisms, and all methods listed under
section (f) are of equal standing and availability to the plaintiff.92
83. Id. at 705.
84. Id. Under this section, a court cannot grant service by alternative
means unlisted in section 308, unless the moving party has shown that he
has made actual prior efforts to effectuate service pursuant to paragraphs (1),
(2), and (4) that proved to be impracticable. N.Y.C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney
2001); Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
85. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
86. Id. at 707-08; see also 308(5).
87. The court also directed "service by international registered air mail
and international mail standard." Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708. The
Southern District of New York also used section 308(5) in directing service
via e-mail. D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511,
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004).
88. Hollow, 747 N.Y.2d at 708.
89. Id. at 705.
90. Courts have also used New York law in permitting e-mail service of
process. See Dennis, 2004 WL 1237511, at *1-2; Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704,
706-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3).
92. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014-16 (9th Cir.
2002); see also Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231 F.R.D. 483, 485-86 (N.D. W.
Va. 2005).
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And finally, the factors mostly considered by these courts include
defendant's elusiveness, 93 defendant's familiarity with e-mail,94
and whether the defendant was a business that conducted or
communicated frequently via internet or e-mail.95 The courts do
not articulate what factors weigh more or are required for e-mail
service, but rather broadly balance the benefits and burdens of e-
mail on a case by case basis as in Rio.96
B. Courts that Rejected E-mail Service
Other courts have rejected service of process via e-mail.
In 1999, 97 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected e-
mail service of process in Wawa, Inc. v. Christensen.98 The court
stated that e-mail was not an approved method of service under
Rule 4.99 The court also noted that despite the fact that the
Judicial Conference Rules Committee recommended changing the
rule to permit e-mail service, it was not adopted by the rules as it
stands. 100
Two years after Rio, the District of Connecticut rejected the
plaintiffs request to serve process via e-mail. 101 After considering
Rio, the court rejected e-mail because it was not reasonably
calculated, under the circumstances, to provide notice to the
defendant. 10 2 Indeed, the plaintiff was not clear where it intended
to serve process.10 3  The plaintiff offered six possible web
addresses under two domain names. 10 4 When the court entered
the given domain names into a web browser, no website
materialized. 10 5 The court noted that traditional means of service
93. See D'Acquisto v. Triffo, No. 05-C-0810, 2006 WL 44057, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 6, 2006); Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
94. See DAcquisto, 2006 WL 44057, at *2.
95. See Williams, 231 F.R.D. at 487.
96. See Rio, 284 F.3d at 1018.
97. One year before Broadfoot.
98. 44 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 589, 590-91 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
99. Id. at 590-91.
100. Id. at 591.
101. Pfizer, Inc. v. Domains By Proxy, No. Civ.A.3:04 CV 741(SR., 2004
WL 1576703, at *1-2 (D. Conn. July 13, 2004).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. One of the domain names led to a blank website with an e-mail
address and the other did not. Id. Under these circumstances, the court
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were not precluded just because the defendants' primary presence
was on the internet; indeed, the plaintiff failed to show that it
investigated other means of service, such as determining whether
the defendants had designated agents in the United States to
receive service of process. 10 6  Interestingly, the court was
concerned with whether the e-mail address itself was accurate, 10 7
and despite failures in other means of service, the court still felt
that traditional means were possible and more practical. 108
Finally, the Southern District of New York, which had
previously authorized e-mail service in D.R.I. v. Dennis,10 9
rejected it in Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mahfouz."O° In Ehrenfeld,
the plaintiff petitioned for court directed service pursuant to Rule
4(0(3) upon the defendant, who resided in Saudi Arabia. 111
Specifically, the plaintiff sought to serve the defendant by e-mail;
mail to a business address and defendant's post office box, both
being in Saudi Arabia; and by service to defendant's attorneys
located in both the United Kingdom and the United States. 112
The court rejected service by e-mail because the plaintiff did not
present any evidence that the defendant maintained the alleged
website, monitored the alleged e-mail address, or would otherwise
receive e-mail messages. 113 While the defendant in Rio conducted
business through its e-mail address, it appeared in Ehrenfeld that
the e-mail address was only used for receiving requests for
information. 114
Although these courts did not authorize e-mail service, it
seems clear that, with the exception of Wawa, they all employed
the Rio's broad balancing test. The fact that the courts rejected e-
mail service is immaterial; rather, what is important is that they
"[did] not feel confident that [e-mails] to any of the proposed [e-mail]
addresses [were] likely to reach the defendants." Id.
106. Id. at *2.
107. The court double-checked the addresses. See id. at *1.
108. Id. at *2.
109. D.R.I. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004) (directing service via e-mail pursuant to section
308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules).
110. No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,
2005).
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at*3.
114. Id.
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all applied the Ninth Circuit's test. Accordingly, in the area of
Rule 4(f)(3), Rio is the majority trend.
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
As discussed above, the courts that have considered service of
process via e-mail to international defendants have mostly relied
upon Rule 4(f)(3). 1 15 This rule requires authorization from the
court, and a method of service that is not prohibited by any
international agreement. 116 The Hague Service Convention is an
international agreement that could prohibit e-mail service of
process. 1 17 The question of whether the Convention prohibits
service via e-mail is important because the United States and
many of its principle trading partners are members. 1 18 However,
the Convention is silent on the issue.1 19 In order to analyze
whether it would permit or prohibit e-mail service, this comment
will cover how federal courts have resolved the question of
registered mail.
The default means of conducting service under the
Convention is for member states to designate a central authority
that receives requests for service, certifies that parameters have
been complied with, and then forwards service to the appropriate
parties. 120  However, Article 10(a) has created confusion.' 2 '
Article 10(a) provides: "Provided the State of destination does not
object, the present Convention will not interfere with - (a) the
freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to
persons abroad."'12 2 The "send" provision has split the circuit
courts over whether "send judicial documents" includes service of
process via postal channels. 123 Two approaches have developed
115. See supra Parts II-III.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3); see also Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink,
284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002).
117. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 8.
118. This includes the United Kingdom, Japan, China, Canada, France,
Russia, Mexico, and Italy. See Authorities, Convention of 15 November 1965
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.
authorities&cid=17 (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
119. Of course, e-mail was not fathomable in 1965.
120. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 7, art. 2-6.
121. Id. art. 10(a).
122. Id.
123. See id.
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which will be discussed briefly.
The Second Circuit's Ackermann v. Levinei 24 is the chief case
cited for courts that hold that "send" means "service."1 25
Ackermann actually dealt with service via mail on an American
defendant from a German plaintiff. i 26 In holding that the Hague
Service Convention authorizes service of process via registered
mail, the court noted that the United States had not objected to
Article 10(a). 12 7 Therefore, it would be gutting the purpose of the
Convention not to allow mail service on an American defendant
when other federal courts have consistently permitted such
service on defendants located in signatory countries that have not
made an Article 10(a) objection.' 28 The court was persuaded that
Article 10(a) uses "send" instead of "service" as a result of careless
drafting, and not construing it as such would make the provision
superfluous. 129
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit did not construe "send"
to mean "service" in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp.'30 The court
reasoned that subparagraphs (b) and (c) use the word "service,"
whereas subparagraph (a) uses the word "send"; therefore, if the
drafter's had intended to include service of process in this
provision, they would have explicitly done so.1 31 Relying on the
statutory construction that calls for a statute to be interpreted by
the language itself,' 32 the court denied service via registered
mail.' 33
This dispute was essentially won by the side that construed
send to mean service when the Special Commission to the Hague
Convention recommended that service is implicit in send.' 34 The
124. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 839.
126. Id. at 833-34.
127. Id. at 839.
128. Id. at 839-40; see also Hague Service Convention, supra note 7 art.
10(a).
129. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839 (citations omitted).
130. 889 F.2d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1989).
131. Id. at 173-74.
132. Id. at 174 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
133. Id.
134. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE
PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE HAGUE APOSTILLE, EVIDENCE AND SERVICE
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recommendations clearly state that send is understood as
meaning service of process through postal channels. 135 Even
though this interpretation effectively ends the dispute, the
Western District of Kentucky is still steadfast in its contrary
interpretation of Article 10(a).136
The analysis of service via registered mail under the Hague
Service Convention can prove instrumental in deciding whether or
not e-mail service is permitted. Up until now, courts have, at best,
skirted around the issue of whether the Convention prohibits e-
mail service. 137 However, in examining the Convention, it does
not expressly prohibit service of process via e-mail, which alone
may be sufficient for a Rule 4(f)(3) petition, because as the rule
states, the method of service cannot be prohibited by international
agreement. 138 Thus, a court could rule that because e-mail is not
prohibited by the Convention, it is permissible. 139
V. THE BENEFITS AND SHORTFALLS OF E-MAIL
With this new manner of service being authorized by courts
around the country in order to serve process to international
defendants, it is important to look at the manner of service itself
to determine whether it is a reliable method that provides
reasonably calculated notice. While the benefits of e-mail, such as
ease of use and convenience, may be obvious, there are some
serious shortfalls to consider before endorsing it.
The benefits of e-mail as a means of communication are quite
obvious. E-mail is becoming an accepted and the preferred mode
of communication in the world today. It is estimated that 147
million people use e-mail to communicate. 140 As for adults, 88%
CONVENTIONS 11 (2003), http://hcch.e-vision.nlIupload/wop/lse-concl-e.pdf.
135. Id.
136. See Uppendahl v. American Honda Motor Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 531,
534 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that while the Special Commission Report
states that service via mail is allowed under Article 10(a), "the court simply
cannot alter the text of the treaty to add matters not contained therein.").
137. See supra Part III.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3); see also Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink,
284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002).
139. Note, however, that e-mail service is also not explicitly authorized by
the Hague Service Convention. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 8.
But because the standard is "not prohibited," see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3),
authorization is likely not required.
140. EmailLabs, Email Marketing Statistics and Metrics, http://www.
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are estimated to have personal e-mail accounts. 14 1 Furthermore,
e-mails can reach the recipient's inbox literally seconds after they
are sent. As noted by the Court of Appeals of New York, e-mail is
the "evolutionary hybrid of traditional telephone line
communications and regular postal service mail." 142 Thus, e-mail
will continue to serve the mainstream in ways similar to
traditional means of communication.
The Ninth Circuit noted in Rio that it was "cognizant of [e-
mail's] limitations."143 In describing these limitations, the court
stated:
[I]n most instances, there is no way to confirm receipt of
an [e-mail] message. Limited use of electronic signatures
could present problems in complying with the verification
requirements of Rule 4(a) and Rule 11, and system
compatibility problems may lead to controversies over
whether an exhibit or attachment was actually received.
Imprecise imaging technology may even make appending
exhibits and attachments impossible in some
circumstances. 144
In addition to these limitations, there are other shortfalls of e-
mail service worth noting. How can we be sure the intended
recipient actually received the e-mail or actually monitors their
inbox? Additionally, if the inbox is full, delivery will fail and thus
frustrate service. There is also the issue of lost e-mail messages,
or failed deliveries. It is estimated that during the first quarter of
2006, 14% of e-mail messages failed to reach the addressed
inbox. 145 Considering that a projection of 2007 estimates 2.7
trillion e-mail messages in the United States, 14% is an
astounding amount of failed deliveries. 146
In essence, however, these failings are tolerable. The
emaillabs.com/tools/email-marketing-statistics.html Oast visited Sept. 24,
2007).
141. Id.
142. Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 541 (N.Y. 1999).
143. Rio, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
144. Id.
145. EmailLabs, Email Marketing Statistics and Metrics, http://www.
emaillabs.com/tools/email-marketing-statistics.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2007).
146. Id.
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constitutional standard is not actual notice, but rather notice
reasonably calculated to provide parties with an opportunity to be
heard. 147 Moreover, other means of service have their flaws. The
United States Postal Service is vulnerable to human error,
resulting in lost mail and deliveries to wrong addresses. Notice by
publication also carries imperfections because it can be
misprinted. Because every manner of service has its moments of
inaccuracy, a 14% failure rate is arguably reasonable.
Furthermore, as with all technology, e-mail transmissions will
likely improve in the future. In any event, these deficiencies are
real, and reliability should play a central role in the balancing test
that courts should consider in deciding whether e-mail is
reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice of the pendency
of the action.
VI. PROPOSED COURT ADMINISTERED THREE PART TEST AIMED AT
ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS INTERNATIONALLY.
As discussed above, e-mail service is a viable option for
plaintiffs. However, because e-mail service is only available under
court direction, 148 the broad balancing test employed by the Ninth
Circuit 14 9 is insufficient to ensure the integrity of service. The
wide discretion inherent in merely balancing the limitations and
benefits of e-mail service creates a great deal of uncertainty in
whether a plaintiff can obtain court approval. Therefore, a tighter
standard is necessary for something as controversial as e-mail
service of process.
Courts should use a three-part test in deciding whether to
direct e-mail service. Under the test, the plaintiff must meet the
burden of the first two parts or else e-mail service should not be
granted. If the plaintiff successfully meets the first two
requirements, courts should consider relevant, yet not
indispensable, factors to be weighed collectively in the third part
of the test. This tighter standard will aid litigants in predicting
the accessibility of e-mail as an option for service of process.
Moreover, individuals and business entities will be able to better
147. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
149. See Rio, 284 F.3d at 1018.
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assess whether their current conduct makes them vulnerable to e-
mail service.
Before this comment discusses the three-part test, it is
imperative to note that for proceedings in federal courts, e-mail
service of process should only be available under Rule 4(f)(3). In
other words, e-mail service should not be permitted under any
other rule or section of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If a
plaintiff should attempt to serve via e-mail without court
direction, he should be precluded from using Rule 4(f)(3) for
failure to seek court approval and such service should be held per
se invalid.
A. Mandatory Elements
The two mandatory elements of the three-part test are crucial
to the goal of ensuring the integrity of e-mail service of process.
These two elements are (1) a prima facie showing by the plaintiff
that traditional means of service have proved impractical, and (2)
a showing by the plaintiff that service to this particular e-mail
address is reasonably reliable.
First, and likely the most important, a plaintiff seeking court
authorization for e-mail service of process must make a prima
facie showing that traditional means of service have proved
impractical. 15° The Rio court stated that the plaintiff "need not
have attempted every permissible means of service of process
before petitioning the court for alternative relief. Instead, [the
plaintiff] needf] only . . . demonstrate that the facts and
circumstances . . . necessitate[] the . .. court's intervention."
' 15 1
The problem with this standard is that it is vague and provides
little guidance as to what "facts and circumstances" are sufficient
to necessitate court involvement. Also, it is unclear how many
attempts at serving the defendant are necessary before a court can
grant alternative relief. The Rio standard undermines
predictability, which is essential to the "smooth functioning of our
courts of law."'152 Additionally, the rigid standard of e-mail as a
150. See supra Part I for a discussion of traditional means of service,
including personal service, notice by publication, and service via mail to the
defendant's last known address.
151. Rio, 284 F.3d at 1016.
152. Id.
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last resort-that e-mail service of process may only be granted
after the plaintiff has shown that every available means of service
has been exhausted-is unnecessary. 153  This standard is too
taxing and could render e-mail service impossible in many cases.
Instead, the standard articulated by the Hollow court should be
adopted, which requires a showing that other methods of service
are impracticable. 154  Impracticability requires "a competent
showing as to the actual prior efforts that [have been] made to
effect service."'1 55  Once the plaintiff shows that actual and
reasonable efforts to effect service have been made to no avail, the
prima facie burden under this test is satisfied.
The second element is a showing that the recipient's e-mail
address is reasonably reliable. The e-mail address need only be
reasonably reliable because minimum due process requires notice
reasonably calculated to apprise parties of the action. 156 This
element can be satisfied, for example, with evidence of prior
communications using the e-mail address, which clearly shows the
address's inherent reliability. Courts could also examine any
websites held by defendants to see if an e-mail address is listed, as
was done by the Pfizer court. 157 In short, requiring plaintiffs to
prove the reliability of the recipient's e-mail address will prevent
them from submitting fraudulent addresses, or ones that are
unlikely to reach the intended recipient. 158
B. Non-Mandatory Factors
Assuming that the first two elements are met, the court
should then weigh other factors to assess the likelihood that e-
mail service of process will reach the defendant.
153. See Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing "You've Got Mail" from Meaning
"You've Been Served" How Service of Process by E-mail Does Not Meet
Constitutional Procedural Due Process Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1121, 1150 (2005) ("E-mail should only be available as a last resort, meaning
only after the court has determined that the plaintiff has exhausted all
traditional means of serving the defendant.").
154. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)
(interpreting section 308(5) of the New York Practice Law and Rules).
155. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
156. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
157. Pfizer, Inc. v. Domains By Proxy, No. Civ.A.3:04 CV 741(SR., 2004
WL 1576703, at *1-2 (D. Conn. July 13, 2004).
158. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
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The first factor is related to the mandatory showing of
reasonable attempts at service. 159 Here, the court will evaluate
the extent to which traditional means of service have failed. The
more attempts that have failed, the stronger the balance is in
favor of e-mail service of process. If all means of service have been
exhausted, making e-mail the last resort, 160 a strong inference
will arise that service by e-mail is not only appropriate, but
necessary. These circumstances are not necessary to permit e-
mail service, but due to the strong inference created by e-mail
being the last resort, it may be in the plaintiffs best interest to
exhaust all means of traditional service.
The next factor is whether there has been prior
communications via e-mail between the parties. This factor is
particularly important because the existence of prior
communications creates the presumption that the defendant
monitors and communicates through his e-mail address. Note
that prior communications may also satisfy the mandatory
showing of a reasonably reliable e-mail address, yet if this
mandatory component is satisfied for reasons separate and
distinct, courts may still decline to direct e-mail service because of
no prior e-mail communications between the parties.
Another factor is the defendant's conduct during the service
period. Specifically, this factor concerns the defendant's
elusiveness. For example, the elusive, globe-trotting nature of the
Broadfoot defendant convinced the court to authorize e-mail
service. 161  This factor is not mandatory because traditional
means of service may still be impractical with non-elusive
defendants. 162  However, a showing that the defendant was
elusive should weigh heavily in favor of authorizing the use of e-
mail in order to deter affirmative conduct that frustrates service of
process.
Additionally, the issue of whether the defendant is a business
159. See supra Part VI(a).
160. See Schreck, supra note 153, at 1150.
161. Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.), 245 B.R. 713,
718, 720-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000); see also D'Acquisto v. Triffo, No. 05-C-
0810, 2006 WL 44057, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2006).
162. See Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL
1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002) (court held that service by e-mail
would be constitutionally permissible "[a]though [the defendant] does not
appear to have been as elusive as the defendant in Rio .... ).
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entity operating in e-commerce or an individual may be pivotal in
deciding the service issue. The Rio court noted that the defendant
had "embraced modern e-business and profited immensely from
it. '163 Several other cases have also principally relied on the fact
that the defendant was a player in e-commerce, especially in cases
where e-mail was the defendant's "preferred contact." 164 Thus,
courts should favor authorizing e-mail service on business entities
that regularly communicate and conduct business via e-mail. As
for individuals, assuming they are not acting as a business entity,
courts should consider the other factors discussed above.
Finally, there should be a residual factor reserved for
consideration by the court. This factor will encompass factors not
discussed that arise in specific cases. The plaintiff would still
have to satisfy the two mandatory requirements for this to be even
considered. Furthermore, the new factor to be considered must be
necessary. More specifically, without it e-mail service is unlikely
under the balancing test. Additionally, the new factor must be
material, in that it significantly relates to service of process or to
the technologies involved with e-mail. If necessity and materiality
are satisfied (along with the mandatory requirements) the factor
should be considered by courts.
CONCLUSION
E-mail is clearly a viable option for service of process.
Nevertheless, the integrity of constitutional notice must be
preserved. There is no need to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as the proper mechanism for e-mail service is found in
Rule 4(0(3), which gives courts the power to direct alternative
means of service of process. By straying from the broad and
unpredictable balancing test imposed by the Ninth Circuit, and
instead using the three part test discussed above, courts will be
able to preserve and ensure the integrity of service of process,
while at the same time ushering the judiciary into the new age of
163. Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017-18 (9th Cir.
2002).
164. Id. at 1018; see also Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231 F.R.D. 483, 487(N.D. W. Va. 2005) (defendants were "sophisticated participants in e-
commerce"); Viz Commc'ns, Inc. v. Redsun, No. C-01-04235 JF, 2003 WL
23901766, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2003) (defendant's website only listed e-
mail address as contact information).
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